



Questo fascicolo di «Teoria» costituisce il secondo di due volumi incentrati sul tema della fiducia. Se nel precedente si è dato spazio ad una impostazione decisamente più teorica, in questo secondo fascicolo la fiducia viene approfondita in una prospettiva storico-cronologica, concentrandosi su alcuni autori della storia del pensiero in cui tale questione è stata esplicitamente affrontata. Si tratta di una raccolta di saggi che mirano ad aprire il dibattito contemporaneo sul tema a ulteriori e successivi sviluppi.

[Consulta l'indice](#)

*This issue of «Teoria» constitutes the second of two volumes focused on the theme of trust. If*

## Il prisma della fiducia. The Prismatic Shape of Trust (2)

Scritto da Administrator

Mercoledì 08 Gennaio 2020 10:26

---

*in the previous one space has been given to a decidedly more theoretical approach, in this second issue trust is deepened in a historical-chronological perspective, focusing on some authors of the history of thought in which this question has been explicitly addressed. It is a collection of essays that aims to open the contemporary debate on the subject to further and subsequent developments.*

[Browse this issue ToC](#)

### I. *Il prisma della virtù / The Prismatic Shape of Trust (2)*

[Preface / Prefazione](#) , Veronica Neri  
[PDF \(English\)](#) , pp. 5-10

[Tra fiducia ed inganno: il ruolo della retorica nella sfera pubblica \(a partire dagli antichi Greci\)](#) ,  
Mauro Serra  
[PDF](#) , pp. 11-31

## Il prisma della fiducia. The Prismatic Shape of Trust (2)

Scritto da Administrator

Mercoledì 08 Gennaio 2020 10:26

---

*According to an interpretation still predominant, rhetoric, identified with the use of deceptive discourse to which trust cannot be granted, constitutes a threat to communication in the public sphere. Starting from two emblematic texts of the ancient Greek world related to the experience of Athenian democracy in the 5th century B.C., our paper tries to show that this interpretation is misleading. On the contrary, it is precisely rhetoric that offers conceptual resources to deal with the intertwining of trust and deception, which inevitably characterizes the public sphere.*

[Inhabiting the Ethical Life: Habit and Trust in Hegel's Philosophy](#) , Elisa Magri  
[PDF \(English\)](#) , pp. 33-50

*This paper explores the relation between habit and ethical life in Hegel's philosophy drawing on both Hegel's Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and the Philosophy of Right. For Hegel, habituality underlies the constitution of dispositions, including the sense of belonging to the the community and the state that is distinctive of ethical life. However, habit in itself does not suffice to motivate or to justify trust in the state. In this light, I reconsider the difference between habit and trust in ethical life by looking at the specific nexus that holds together institutions and citizens. This will lead to a reconsideration of ethical life as a form of inhabiting the social and political dimension that is informed by conscious acknowledgment and appropriation. Accordingly, I argue that while habituality in the Anthropology is crucial for the cultivation of sensibility, ethical trust involves the cultivation of interest, memory, as well as theoretical and practical position-taking.*

[The Dialectic between Trust, Faith and Parrhesia in Fear and Trembling by Søren Kierkegaard](#),  
Gloria Dell'Eva  
[PDF \(English\)](#) , pp. 51-70

*In this article, I analyse the concept of trust in Fear and Trembling, where it is closely related to*

## Il prisma della fiducia. The Prismatic Shape of Trust (2)

Scritto da Administrator

Mercoledì 08 Gennaio 2020 10:26

---

*faith, even though there never is a perfect correspondence between the two: Faith is a more complex phenomenon, because trust is always only one of the two feelings that are paradoxically involved in faith. In my interpretation, faith is a struggle between antithetical feelings of man towards God: first, between trust in an almighty God and fear of a tyrannical God; secondly between this fear and a new kind of trust, no longer in an omnipotent God but rather in a God who dwells in man himself and in the world. The task of the individual, once he knows of this divine presence, becomes the expression of this new fiduciary bond with God before other persons. I will show that this communicative, social task is an example of parrhesia.*

[The Ontological Conditions of Trust in Nicolai Hartmann's Thinking](#) , Carlo Brentari  
[PDF \(English\)](#) , pp. 71-87

*This paper focuses on the issue of trust (Vertrauen) and trustworthiness (Zuverlässigkeit) in Nicolai Hartmann's stratified ontology. Our analysis will start with Hartmann's Ethics (1926) and then discuss parts of Das Problem des geistigen Seins (1933) and Philosophie der Natur (1950). In his mature works, Hartmann approaches the axiological situation of trust from the viewpoint of the permanence of all elements involved in it: trust as an ideal value, the tangible goods that substantiate a relationship of trust, the other persons and, finally, the moral subject or person (for others to trust me, my personal identity must be stable). From this viewpoint, for trust to be made real it is the whole ontological context that, notwithstanding its processuality, has to guarantee a (relative) ontological stability. This approach gives Hartmann the opportunity to address a harsh criticism to philosophical substantialism and to develop an innovative view of the modality of ontological persistence of the person.*

[Il principio deludibilità come "gradiente fiduciario"](#) , Agostino Cera

## Il prisma della fiducia. The Prismatic Shape of Trust (2)

Scritto da Administrator  
Mercoledì 08 Gennaio 2020 10:26

---

[PDF](#) , pp. 89-110

*Starting from Karl Löwith's Mitanthropologie, my paper aims to put forward a principle of disappointability conceived as a "trust gradient" for the interhuman dimension.*

*Löwith's Mitanthropologie develops a taxonomy of the different binary bonds, at the top of which emerges the "absolute relationship between an I self and a you self".*

*The peculiarity of this bond is based on trust and responsibility*

*. In order to*

*prove the responsible and trust-based intentionality of the two related*

*, I propose the*

*principle of disappointability*

*, inspired by Popper's*

*principle of falsification*

*. The authenticity of a relationship depends on the fact that each relatum responds entirely for itself within the space of*

*Miteinandersein*

*. In other words, I can show my*

*trust*

*(in my co-relatum) only if I*

*entrust*

*(to it). Such a total entrusting can be attested only by the fact that I am "falsifiable", namely "disappointable"*

*". The principle of disappointability emerges therefore as a natural "*

*trust gradient*

*".*

[Phenomenologies of Trust](#) , Alice Pugliese

[PDF \(English\)](#) , pp. 111-132

*Aim of the paper is to compare different phenomenological accounts of the phenomenon of trust. After moving from the "noematic" observation of trust as embedded in the world, toward*

## Il prisma della fiducia. The Prismatic Shape of Trust (2)

Scritto da Administrator

Mercoledì 08 Gennaio 2020 10:26

---

*the “noetic” consideration of trust as a subjective act, we introduce the view of trust as a specific kind of perceptive experience giving the person as a totality and being characterized by a displacing double intentionality. Trust is therefore grasped as a teleological intentional process. This requires a phenomenological-genetic approach and challenges us to overcome the restrictions imposed by a static phenomenology of trust. The genetic approach focuses on trust as a grounding and self-fostering experience that discloses an essential anthropological feature. The phenomenological analysis thus suggests that what is at stake in the experience of trust is not only, and perhaps not primarily, the unity and stability of experience and society, but rather their mobility, flexibility, and vitality.*

[Subordinating Trust to Text: A Hermeneutic Reversal](#) , Stefan Lukits  
[PDF \(English\)](#) , pp. 133-146

*In analytic philosophy, the concept of trust is often considered primarily to be a three-place relation between trustor, trustee, and the domain of trust. The analysis of trust is unsatisfactory, however, if such a relationship is derivative of other forms of trust, and consequently the analysis has only succeeded in explaining a particular branch of trust rather than explaining the root. Annette Baier considers a climate of trust, with all the moral perils of intimacy, explanatorily superior to contract-based, rational trust between non-intimate equals in modern Western philosophy and thus provides an example of how the traditional analytic model is problematic. In this paper, I propose another account on which the conventional three-place trust relationship investigated in analytic philosophy is derivative. Based on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, humans are constitutively hermeneutic. If Heidegger’s fundamental ontology or a similar hermeneutic anthropology is accepted, then trust relationships between humans are explanatorily subordinated to trust relationships between readers and texts rather than the other way around, as traditional accounts suggest. This reversal has a significant impact not only on our analysis of trust, but also on moral theory, personal identity, and scientific method. My paper details both the reversal in explanatory primacy and the implications for these philosophical disciplines.*

## Il prisma della fiducia. The Prismatic Shape of Trust (2)

Scritto da Administrator

Mercoledì 08 Gennaio 2020 10:26

---

[Fede in Dio come fede nell'uomo. Il concetto di fiducia nel pensiero di Emmanuel Levinas](#) ,

Silvia Dadà

[PDF](#) , pp. 147-166

*The term "trust" appears very rarely in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. Even the related one of "faith", although more present, is used with some caution in the philosophical arguments of the author. This absence of the term, however, does not imply an absence of the concept. In this article I will show that, far from being absent, trust always goes together with responsibility, which is the central concept of the Levinas' ethics. I will focus on two kinds of trust: an original one, which transcends knowledge, and a conscious one, which concerns knowledge, calculation and judgement. I will show that, for Levinas, both the relationship with God and the ethical relationship with the other man are characterized by the original trust, whereas the conscious trust takes place in justice.*

[Fede fidata e fede giurata in Jacques Derrida](#) , Carmelo Meazza

[PDF](#) , pp. 167-181

*Jacques Derrida proposes to think of the experience of religion as an ellipse with two foci: on the one hand we would have the experiences of belief and blind trust, on the other the experience of sacredness or of holiness. The two moments should never be confused. The essay aims to delimit their singularity, and even irreducibility, since only from this delimitation one could become aware of their unstable co-implication and of the fact that the religious can sometimes silence their difference and duality. For this reason it becomes important to underline a certain gap between a trusted faith and a sworn faith. A gap, at the limits of an automatism, for which a belief in the other is always on the verge of becoming deified in a god.*

[La nozione di trust nella filosofia della religione di J. Schellenberg: un approccio storico](#) , Marco Damonte

[PDF](#) , pp. 183-199

*The reception of Schellenberg's philosophy of religion is concentrated on his skeptical approach, on his evolutionary conception of human beings and on his principle of imagination, consistently with his own presentation of his thought. Instead, I feel the role that the concept of trust covers in his proposal, is quite neglected. Herein I propose, on the one hand, to fill this gap showing how a study of the use of the notion of trust by Schellenberg is decisive in order to understand his criticism of traditional philosophy of religion, and to appreciate his proposal of a religious skepticism. On the other hand, I intend to underline his conception about trust to better understand the relevance and the potentiality of this notion in the contemporary philosophical debate. I will use a historical method, paying attention to the context in which Schellenberg writes his works, to his more or less express sources and to the more and more well-constructed distinctions he suggests in his studies, without leaving out any terminological ambiguity.*

[The Constitutive Role of Trust in Semantics](#) , Giacomo Turbanti

[PDF \(English\)](#) , pp. 201-217

*The aim of this paper is to characterize the semantic notion of trust, as it has been introduced by Robert Brandom. Traditionally, the concept of trust does not play any central role in semantics. This, I suggest, depends on the fact that the very social dimension plays a rather marginal role in the traditional representationalist theory of meaning. In Brandom's normative inferentialism, instead, trust is essential to the constitution of the discursive communities, whose rules are taken to define contents.*



### ***premio di studi Vittorio Sainati 2018-2019***

[Metodo e proposizione filosofica in Kant e Hegel](#) , Giulio Gorla  
[PDF](#) , pp. 221-238

*My aim, in this paper, is to discuss the role of the propositional form as expression of the logical-linguistic essence of philosophy. To this end, I will make a comparison between Kant's and Hegel's perspectives, using for Kant transcendental proofs, analyzed in Methodenlehre's «Discipline of Pure Reason». For Hegel I will examine the passage expounding the "speculative proposition" in the Preface of Phenomenology of Spirit. My first aim is to point out the role of judgement's propositional form, at the one hand, for the relationship between synthesis a priori and its propositional expression articulated in Critique of the pure Reason and, at the other hand, for the dialectical movement of the proposition itself that – according to Hegel – is the "speculative in act" (das wirklich Speculative), nothing but the articulation and exposition of the interdependency of propositions on each other. There is no doubt that Kant and Hegel propose two different analysis of logical capacity of philosophy. These differences are based on two dissimilar objects of philosophical knowledge, as transcendental and speculative synthesis a priori. But there is a common element between reason's transcendental reflective knowledge of its own procedure and speculative proposition as meta-theoretical reflection on our linguistic capacities. This main common aspect is the role of the propositional practice (praxis) in the philosophical knowledge. It cannot be experienced or judged by understanding; but what kind of experience is it possible for it? To point out this problem – that is the problem of reason's discursive capacity of self-knowledge – is our second aim in this paper.*

[Facing Moral Complexity. The Role of Moral Excellence in Guiding Moral Judgment](#) , Simone Grigoletto  
[PDF \(English\)](#) , pp. 239-258

*Post-modern societies have been marked by an increasing diversity of ideas on how to live a good life. As the current debate on normative ethics shows, this trait has opened up the field to various pluralist moral accounts. Accordingly, a phenomenological analysis of the agent's first-person experience discloses the manifold moral sources that can guide his or her choices. This pluralism needs further characterization. In this paper, I introduce a distinction between*

## Il prisma della fiducia. The Prismatic Shape of Trust (2)

Scritto da Administrator

Mercoledì 08 Gennaio 2020 10:26

---

axiological pluralism

*(the set of moral values) and*

methodological pluralism

*(the heterogeneity of moral reasoning). This distinction discloses a well-known problem: how can the agent recognize the moral reasons for one's action in such a moral structure? I argue in favor of the traditional role of*

phrónesis

*. In particular, I emphasize how*

moral excellence

*(as highlighted by the contemporary debate on the concept of*

supererogation

*and recent works on*

moral exemplarism

*) can provide a valuable source of the formation and the enhancement of moral judgment.*

[Direzioni di adattamento. La critica al non-cognitivismo etico nella Logica di Hegel](#) , Armando Manchisi

[PDF](#) , pp. 259-271

*One of the strongest arguments that ethical non-cognitivism uses in its own defense is that according to which knowledge and will structure themselves as different "directions of fit": while knowledge, in order to be correct, implies that the mind has to fit the world, the will, in order to be effective, requires that the world has to fit the mind. Non-cognitivists thus believe that moral judgments are expression of will alone, and not of knowledge, and cannot therefore be considered true or justifiable. At the end of the Science of Logic , in the pages devoted to the idea of the true and the idea of the good, Hegel analyzes in details this kind of argument and shows its groundlessness: for Hegel it is not possible to separate will from knowledge without falling into complex aporias. Aim of the contribution is to shed light on those pages, still little studied today, and thus outline a possible alternative to the non-cognitivist ethical model.*