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Unwelcome Trust

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Introduction

In general, trust appears to be a good thing. A society which fosters and is built on trust is better than one that is not. Despite this, we sometimes reject the trust that other people place in us. This may be because we view the trust as a burden, because we feel that we are unworthy of trust, or even because we do not have the right sort of relationship with the person who trusts us, despite whether or not we are ourselves worthy of trust. Unwelcome trust typically arises when the trustor expects a specific type of action from trustee, but the trustee, for whatever reason, does not want to do what the trustor wants. The existence and importance of this phenomenon has been only hinted at in the literature on trust and trustworthiness. Special attention has been paid to whether or not certain accounts of trust or trustworthiness can explain any aspect of the phenomena at all. Typically this has taken the form of criticism. Karen Jones (1996: 9-11), for example, has argued against Annette Baier's (1986) and other *entrusting* accounts of trust, by suggesting that these sorts of accounts cannot handle the full range of cases of unwelcome trust. Carolyn McLeod (2002: 32-33) has in turn also argued against Jones' (1996) account of trust, by suggesting that her account cannot handle unwelcome trust. Despite the noted importance of unwelcome trust in such discourses, no sustained account of the phenomena itself has been developed. In this essay I develop such an account.

I argue that, in fact, multiple accounts of trust are needed to explain unwelcome trust. This is because trustees may reject either what it is they are being entrusted with, though not the trust, or the very trust itself, but not whatever they are being entrusted with.

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1. *Trusting to Keep Secrets*

In this section I will begin by describing what I take to be a relatively straightforward example of unwelcome trust. I will then show what it is that various accounts of trust would imply about how to explain what aspect of the trusting relationship is being objected to in this sort of scenario. It is important to start with a simple example because it is not always clear how an account of trust can handle the phenomena, if an account can even handle it at all. In this preliminary analysis of unwelcome trust I will argue that we can divide these accounts into two separate camps. I will call these the trust-rejection and entrusted-rejection model, and will develop each model throughout the paper.

Consider a simple situation involving two friends, Veronica and Nathan. Veronica trusts Nathan to keep her secrets, but Nathan does not welcome this trust. He might not want to keep *those* secrets, he might not trust himself to keep them, or he might not believe that he bears the appropriate sort of relationship to Veronica for her to entrust her secrets to him. The particular reasons that Nathan has for rejecting Veronica's trust are not important. What is important about this example, as will become clear when we look at further examples, is that Veronica and Nathan are peers. There is also no relevant power differential obtaining between them. Now let's look at how some of the different accounts of trust would explain what it is that Nathan might be objecting to in this type of case. I will not be exploring all aspects of each account, only those relevant to explaining this case of unwelcome trust.

Annette Baier (1986) provides one of the most prominent and influential accounts of trust. According to her analysis, trust is a three-place relation involving a trustor, a trustee, and some valued thing that the trustor entrusts the trustee with. Karen Jones (2004: 4) refers to these sorts of account as a three-place analyses. According to Jones, three-place trust is no different from mere reliance. We can rely on thermometers to accurately report the temperature, but we cannot trust thermometers. We are not betrayed when a thermometer fails to do its job, but we often are when someone we trust breaks that trust. Thus, Baier's account distinguishes trust from mere reliance by taking trust as a special kind of reliance: reliance on another's goodwill (1986: 234). Now, though separating trust from reliance is an important task, it will not play a role here in the argument. The cases I will be considering will uncontroversially be instances of trust rather than reliance. What will be controversial is their status as cases of

unwelcome trust. Thus, in this case, Baier's account of trust would imply that Veronica is the trustor, Nathan is the trustee, and the valued thing that she is entrusting him with is keeping her secrets. According to this analysis of trust then, Nathan is not objecting to the trust *per se*, but the thing that Veronica is entrusting him with. Nathan does not want to keep Veronica's secrets.

Karen Jones (1996) offers another prominent account of trust. According to Jones, «to trust someone is to have an attitude of optimism about her goodwill and to have the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that you are counting on her» (Jones 1996: 5-6). For our purposes, the key part of her account of trust involves the aspect of a confident expectation. According to her analysis, Nathan is rejecting Veronica's confident expectation that he will directly and favourably be moved by the thought that she is counting on him. In fact, this is what she herself says about a similar sort of example, though she does note that most cases of unwelcome trust will be cases where what is entrusted is rejected (Jones 1996: 9-11).

Philip Pettit (1995) offers what he calls a trust-responsive account of trust. His account is meant to cover situations wherein trustors don't have good reasons for believing that the particular trustee is trustworthy. Even without these reasons people can decide to trust if they have reason to assume that the trustee desires to be held in regard (Pettit 1995: 219). Being trusted, and being considered trustworthy, is a good thing, and the trustor will expect her trust to motivate trustees. The key part of Pettit's account for our purposes is his focus on motivation. According to his analysis, Nathan would be objecting to Veronica's trust because he is rejecting her intention to motivate him to keep her secrets that is part and parcel with her trust. That is, Nathan is objecting to Veronica's intention to motivate him.

For our purposes these three views fall into two camps. On Baier's entrusting model it is the secrets entrusted that are unwelcome and not the trust *per se*; on Pettit's and Jones' coercion models it is the trust itself that is objected to and not the secrets being entrusted *per se*. On the trust-rejection model, there are many different ways of explaining what trust is, and how it differs from notions like reliance. In terms of how we analyze unwelcome trust, these different ways of cashing out trust would simply provide further differentiations. Let's now move to a more complex example.

2. *Trusting in Professional Relationships*

In this section I will consider how the trust-rejection and entrusting-rejection models handle an example of unwelcome trust that I will develop that may hold in professional relationships. Although I use this sort of example, I believe the case will also hold in other relationships where there might be some discrepancy between how the two agents view their respective relationships. I have chosen examples from professional relationships because they are clear, plausible, and hopefully uncontroversial. I will begin by describing some situations where trust can be unwelcome in professional relationships. I will then argue that the entrusting rejection model provides the correct description of what is being objected to in these sorts of situations despite first appearances.

The sort of case that I want to consider for this section comes from reflecting on an example of a teacher rejecting the trust of her student provided by Carolyn McLeod. I quote her example in full:

> [I]f a student trusts his teacher to be emotionally supportive in the way that a parent would be, but the teacher does not (nor does she want to) think of her relationship with the student as being like that, the student's trust would be unwanted (McLeod 2002: 33).

Similar examples arise in the context of health care. A medical practitioner may not welcome the trust of her patients, when, for example, her patients trust her to make house calls or perform unnecessary procedures (McLeod 2004: 189-190). Likewise, if a patient trusts a medical practitioner to be emotionally attentive to her needs as a lover would be, and the practitioner does not think of her relationship with the patient in this way, the patient's trust would also be unwelcome (McLeod 2004: 190). What is important to note about these sorts of examples is that they, unlike the example involving secret keeping, which was between peers, involve a distinct power differential, and also include a professional element. These differences put constraints on the forms of trust that ought to obtain between the two agents. I will now show what it is that the teacher (similarly for the medical practitioner) objects to on the three accounts of trust under consideration.

Let's first consider how the entrusting-rejection model would handle this sort of case. According to this model, the teacher is objecting to the specific task of being emotionally supportive like a parent would be toward the student. But what exactly is the student «entrusting» the teacher

with? There is no obvious good or valued thing that is being entrusted. The student is not giving anything over to the teacher to look after. Thus, this model cannot adequately deal with this sort of case. However, there is a way of avoiding this initial problem, as I will discuss below, if we are less strict about the sorts of things we allow to be entrusted. Before I develop the entrusting-rejection model further, I will explicate how the two different versions of the trust-rejection model would handle this sort of case.

Recall that on the trust-rejection model it is the trust, not the entrusted thing that is being rejected. Thus, the teacher is rejecting the trust that the student is offering, not the specific thing that is being entrusted, because there is no specific entrusted thing. According to Pettit's (1995) account, the teacher is objecting because the student intends to motivate the teacher to perform an expected action, being emotionally supportive in the way a parent would, by trusting the teacher. Similarly, according Jones' (1996), there is an element of coercion. The teacher is rejecting the student's confident expectation that the teacher will directly and favourably be moved by the thought that the student is counting on them to behave as a parent would toward the student (Jones 1996: 11). Without either the intention to motivate, or the confident expectation, these would not constitute cases of trust, and so, if this is a case of trust, this must be what the medical practitioner or teacher is rejecting.

Which of these two models better fits the case? On first inspection, the trust-rejection model seems to more adequately explain the scenario than the entrusting-rejection model. It seems more plausible to say that the student is coercing the teacher to behave as the student wants the teacher to behave, and that this is what the teacher is objecting to. It does not seem correct to say that the teacher is objecting to some specific entrusted thing, because there is nothing specific being entrusted. Despite appearances, I think it is possible to say something further. I will now do this by building on McLeod's (2002; 2004) treatment of unwelcome trust.

McLeod (2004: 189-190) argues that unwelcome trust ('unwanted trust') often occurs when there is a mismatch amongst *relationship-specific commitments*. What would this imply about our present case? It would imply that, from the teacher's point of view, she has a relationship-specific commitment to behave professionally as a teacher would toward her students, and not in the way a mother would to her daughter, or in any other way that would conflict with the professional nature of the relationship. From the student's point of view, on the other hand, the student believes that the teacher has a relationship-specific commitment to act as more than just a

mere teacher. In other words, the student believes that the relationship she has with her teacher is closer to that of the relationship she might have with a parent. Of course, in an actual case, the student might not explicitly be aware that they have this sort of belief. The student may simply be confused about what to expect from this teacher, or confused about what one ought to expect from a teacher in general. Talking about this as a belief that the student has is simply a useful way of cashing out what is going on in this example[1]. The student and the teacher have a mismatch, because each views their relationship differently. According to this view, the teacher then is objecting to the way the student perceives their relationship.

McLeod's description does not, at first glance, go against my reconstruction of the trust-rejection model of unwelcome trust. However, I will argue that this is not the case. McLeod's position is best understood as a more sophisticated version of the entrusting-rejection model. I mentioned above that Baier's account has a problem with unwelcome trust in professional relationships, because it is not clear what a student is entrusting the teacher with. One possible solution, as I mentioned earlier, was being vaguer about how we construe the notion of entrusting a specific good. I will now argue that McLeod's understanding of relationship-specific commitments has provided us with a way of solving this problem for the entrusting-model.

Consider again that in this sort of example there is a clear discrepancy between how the teacher and the student view their relationship. The teacher takes the relationship to be a professional one, whereas the student sees the relationship as something more personal. The student believes that the relationship she has with her teacher is more like the one she would have with a parent. In trusting the teacher to be emotionally supportive in the way that a parent would be, the student is, to use Baier's terminology, entrusting the teacher with this type of relationship. The teacher then is rejecting this sort of relationship that the student is entrusting her with.

One might object by arguing that the notion of entrusting is now being stretched too far. We cannot seriously make sense of someone entrusting a specific type of relationship to another person. However, I am reformulating McLeod's account in this language to draw an important parallel. By drawing this parallel we can see what the difference is between the entrusting-rejection model of unwelcome trust and the trust-rejection model.

[1] Thanks to Esther Rosario for pointing this out.

According to the latter, we would say that the teacher is objecting to the coercive aspect of the student's trust. In trusting the teacher to be emotionally supportive in the way that a parent is, the student is trying to coerce the teacher to behave this way. According to the entrusting rejection-model the teacher is objecting to the type of relationship that the student is entrusting to the teacher.

I will now argue that the entrusting-rejection model offers the correct explanation of what the medical practitioner or teacher is rejecting in the sort of professional example of unwelcome trust I am examining. Consider what would happen if the teacher (or medical practitioner) explains why they do not want to be trusted in the way that the student (or patient) is trusting them. The teacher would explain to the student that this is not the way the teacher perceives the relationship, or the way the relationship ought to be perceived. The teacher would say that student's expectations for the teacher to be emotionally attentive are, so to speak, 'out of line,' considering the normal professional relationship that teachers ought to have with their students. On the trust-rejection account the teacher would have to say that the student should not be coercing (or intending to motivate) the teacher to do things she does not want to do. It is not coercion (the student's intention to motivate the teacher, or the student's confident expectation that the teacher will directly and favourably be moved by student's trust) that the teacher is objecting to simpliciter, but the specific content of what the student is trusting the teacher to do. The teacher would (one hopes) want to act in a professional manner no matter what the student would expect of them.

One might object and offer the following defense of the trust-rejection model[2]. According to this model, we can say that the teacher is objecting to the trust, because the teacher perceives this trust as coercive, as an attempt to change the relationship. That is, the trust that the student is bestowing on the teacher is eliciting that the teacher ought to offer this student a special relationship. In response, we can say that this objection gets the order of explanation wrong. The teacher here has a duty to maintain a professional relationship with her students, and she should not accept this sort of relationship under any circumstances. It is not the coercive nature of the trust that she is objecting to, but the relationship. This response becomes even clearer if we consider a situation where the student simply does not understand the nature of what the relationship is supposed to be.

[2] Thanks to Rob Shaver for this objection.

If the teacher knows this, she will simply point out that they cannot have that sort of relationship, and the student, now informed, will hopefully stop trusting the teacher in this way. In sum, this sort of example provides us with a case where the entrusting-rejection model provides the explanation to the detriment of the trust-rejection model. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the trust rejection-account of unwelcome trust is not entirely invaluable. In the next section I will show the sort of scenario where the reverse holds.

3. *Therapeutic Trust*

In this section I show that there are examples of unwelcome trust that the entrusting-model cannot handle, but that the trust-rejection model can. In order to do this, I will first develop a third sort of example of unwelcome trust that involves what is often called «therapeutic trust.» Before I develop this example, I will give a brief explanation of therapeutic trust.

If a person trusts another therapeutically, then that person «aims at increasing the trustworthiness of the person in whom it is placed» (Horsburgh 1960: 346). Unlike most cases of trust, the optimism that is typically present is lacking in this situation. Horsburgh importantly notes that: «Therapeutic trust in the full sense requires that the person trusted should be aware of the reasons for the trust which is placed in him» (Horsburgh 1960: 346). Parents often trust their teenagers with the family car or with taking care of the house while they are away with the belief (or the hope) that they will become more responsible if treated as if they are trustworthy, even if they have proven to be untrustworthy in the past (McGeer 2008: 241). Therapeutic trust is often considered to carry a normative component that non-therapeutic trust lacks, though some argue that all forms of trust carry this component (e.g., Walker 2006: 79-80). That is, when someone trusts therapeutically, the trustor is implying that the trustee should do what she is trusted to do. When parents trust their untrustworthy children with the car after they have crashed it several times, they are giving the impression that the child ought to take care of the car, even if they are not optimistic about what their child might do as they would be if their child had proven herself trustworthy.

Let us imagine a child, Sally, rejecting the therapeutic trust of her parent, Anne. Anne trusts Sally, her oldest child, to look after her younger children, Billy and Connie. Anne wants to engender trustworthy behaviour

in Sally by offering this opportunity to prove whether or not Sally can be trusted. I will leave it open as to whether Sally has, in fact, proven herself to be untrustworthy in the past, because this is irrelevant. In this sort of situation Sally might want to reject Anne's trust for several reasons. However, for the sake of argument, I am going to assume that Sally rejects this trust because she doesn't want to grow up and be responsible for Billy and Connie, and that Sally interprets Anne's trust as implying that she ought to take on this new responsibility. But how do we cash out Sally's reasons for the rejection of Anne's therapeutic trust? I will start by explaining how each model of unwelcome trust would explain this sort of case. I will then argue that the trust-rejection model offers the correct description of the case.

The entrusting-rejection model would explain the situation in the following way. There is a mismatch between how Anne and Sally view their relationship. Anne believes that their relationship is changing. By trusting Sally with babysitting duties, she takes their relationship as different than the relationships she has with Billy and Connie. In Anne's mind Sally is (or is becoming) more grown-up, more trustworthy. Anne expects Sally to interpret their relationship in a similar fashion. Anne expects Sally to view their relationship as that between a more-responsible child and a parent, rather than the relationship she has with a less-responsible child, like either Billy or Connie (or like the relationship that Sally had with Anne in the past). Sally, on the other hand, believes that she is still a kid that does not have more grown-up responsibilities, like looking after Billy and Connie. Sally wants to have the same relationship with Anne that Billy and Connie have with her. In other words, Sally is objecting to the more mature relationship that Anne is entrusting her with.

The trust-rejection model, on the other hand, can offer an alternative explanation of the situation.

According to this model, Anne is trying to coerce Sally in to taking on more responsibilities. According to Pettit's account, Sally is objecting because Anne intends to motivate Sally to babysit Billy and Connie by trusting her. Similarly, according to Jones' account, Sally is rejecting Anne's confident expectation that her daughter will directly and favourably be moved by the thought that she is counting on Sally.

I will argue that the trust-rejection model offers the correct explanation. Consider the sorts of things that Sally would say in conversation with Anne if she refused to accept the babysitting responsibilities. Sally would at first say that she simply did not want to babysit Billy and Connie. If Anne asked her to explain this further she would say that she wanted to

be treated the same as Billy and Connie. If Anne protested, and explained the motivation behind her therapeutic trust, then Sally would still refuse, and claim that she did not want to grow up, and she did not want her mother to make her grow up. Sally is not objecting to the changed relationship she is being entrusted with, she is objecting to the fact that Anne trusts her in order to change the nature of their relationship. Anne trusts her to help her grow up.

One might object that I have concocted this example to fit more closely with the trust-rejection model of unwelcome trust. But there is nothing implausible with my concoction, especially with regard to the exchange between Anne and Sally. Thus, in at least this type of case, the trust-rejection model is required to explain why the trust is unwelcome. Thus, due to the cases I have presented, and the accounts of trust I have considered, we need more than one account to deal with the phenomena.

4. *Rejecting the Stance*

One might object to the disjunctive account of trust I have offered here by suggesting a third possible model of what a trustee might be objecting to in cases of unwelcome trust. In this section I will consider whether or not such an objection can be raised by way of Richard Holton's (1994) participant-stance account of trust. I will first describe his account, and then describe a case of unwelcome trust that his account can explain, but no other can.

According to Holton, whenever we feel resentment, gratitude, or betrayal towards people when they act in certain ways, we are taking a participant stance toward them. A participant stance is what Holton calls Strawson's (1962) participant attitude. According to Holton, trust differs from mere reliance in that it involves a participant stance toward the trustee. Trust is like reliance, but trust involves a readiness to react to the trustee's actions or in-actions in a particular way. If Veronica trusts Nathan to keep her secrets, and Nathan fails to do this, because he drank too much, she will feel betrayal. If, on the other hand, Nathan keeps her secrets and beats a lie-detector, she may feel gratitude toward him.

Consider a scenario involving a healthcare aid, Jesse, and a physically and cognitively disabled client, Darcy. Darcy is capable of feeding himself, but often, seemingly on purpose, he spills his food on the floor if no one is engaging with him in a particular way. Due to the way Darcy reacts

when confronted about throwing his food on the floor, it is clear that he doesn't want to do this. He has also indicated that he does not want to have someone feed him: he wants to be able to feed himself. It also seems to be clear, from other encounters with him, that he doesn't want to be supervised all of the time. In this scenario, one might argue, it is the stance that Jesse is taking toward Darcy that he is objecting to, not the trust, nor the thing that is entrusted.

One might respond by denying the plausibility of this scenario. As a cognitively disabled agent, Darcy simply does not have the cognitive machinery available to reject, or even acknowledge that Jesse is trusting him. Further, because of this, Jesse is just wrong to even trust Darcy in the first place. A worry with this line of response is that Jesse trusting Darcy bears a strong resemblance to Anne trusting her oldest child Sally. If we are correct in saying that Jesse is mistaken to trust Darcy at all, then, so the worry goes, we should also say that Anne is mistaken in trusting Sally. Now of course we might want to respond to this worry and point out an asymmetry between the two cases.

Another response is to just say that even if we are correct to say that Darcy is rejecting the stance that Jesse is taking towards him, this is really another way of describing her trust. This would then place Holton's participant-stance account alongside Jones' and Pettit's versions of the trust-rejection model. This seems to be the correct way of describing this particular situation, however, if there is a very general participant stance that is to be understood as some prerequisite for the particular trust participant stance, then perhaps it's possible for someone to reject that general stance, though not the particular stance. Although it's perhaps the least intuitive of the three, we can call this the participant-stance model of unwelcome trust.

It seems clear from what we have said so far that it is very difficult to provide a general, unified account of unwelcome trust. Different accounts of trust line up with, at the very least, two different models of unwelcome trust: the entrusted-rejection model and the trust-rejection model. Depending on how we analyze Holton's participant-stance account of trust, and the case involving Jesse and Darcy there may even be three different models. However, I think it is best to simply consider his account as another species of the trust-rejection model of unwelcome trust.

5. *We're Not Trustworthy*

Another objection to this disjunctive account might seem to stem from accounts of trustworthiness. An objector may try to develop a case where the trustee is rejecting the trust of the trustor, because the trustee does not deem themselves worthy of trust. In order to respond to this objection, I will first describe a general account of trustworthiness. Following this I will develop and examine an example that purports to show that one can reject trust not because of the thing entrusted, or the trust, but because of being viewed as trustworthy.

Many consider trustworthiness an important virtue (e.g., Potter 2002). Similarly to distinguishing trust from reliance, a virtue-based account helps distinguish trustworthiness from mere reliability. On Potter's (2002) account of trustworthiness she distinguishes at least ten requirements of trustworthiness. I will not consider all of them in detail, but will describe those which are relevant to concocting a particular example of unwelcome trust wherein the trustee is rejecting being viewed as trustworthy. Two of the requirements she distinguishes I view as closely related. First, the requirement «that we respond properly to broken trust» (Potter, 2002, 28). Second, the requirement «that we deal with hurt in relationships-both the hurt we inflict on others and the hurt we experience from others-in ways that sustain connection» (Potter 2002: 28). The general requirement that I take both of these to be getting at is that trustworthy people will respond appropriately if they fail. If you trust a trustworthy person to do something important, and they fail to do it, whether intentionally or not, they will be apologetic and will not be indifferent or callous toward whatever harm has befallen the trustor.

Let's return to our example of secret keeping. Veronica trusts Nathan to keep her secrets, but Nathan rejects this trust. In this case, Nathan is rejecting the trust because he doesn't believe that he is trustworthy. He may appear trustworthy to Veronica, but he has good reasons to believe that he will not be able to keep her secrets. Nathan might, for example, know that he is a blabbermouth that cannot resist the urge to spread gossip, or that he will spill the beans when he is intoxicated. He also values his friendship with Veronica, appreciates the trust she is bestowing upon him, and would love to keep her secrets, if he only believed that he could. That is, he is not rejecting her secrets, or her trust, just the fact that she views him as trusworthy. Is this a plausible scenario?

One might respond by reconsidering the entrusting-rejection model of

unwelcome trust. Although it seems that Nathan is rejecting Veronica's trust because he believes himself untrustworthy, he is really just rejecting what it is that she is entrusting him with: her secrets. The belief that he is untrustworthy with respect to her secrets is why he is rejecting them, but it is the secrets, and not the trust, that he is rejecting. Thus, we can supplement the entrusting-rejection model by filling out different reasons agents may have for rejecting things that are entrusted. This shows us something very important about this model of unwelcome trust: it is not always the entrusted things themselves that are rejected, but sometimes the role these things play in a wider context. That is, sometimes trustees are willing to accept particular entrusted things, but only under specific circumstances. The context matters, and helps explain why the trust is rejected, but ultimately trust is rejected on the basis of what is being entrusted.

6. *Unwelcome Trust and Generic Accounts of Trust*

In this penultimate section I will explore the relationship between the results of my analysis of unwelcome trust and what are called generic accounts of trust (Walker 2006: 79-80). I will begin by describing what I take to be a generic account of trust. Following that, I will explicate what my account of unwelcome trust implies about the potential of a generic account of trust.

Walker argues that there is a generic account of trust that covers the different species of trust available. The generic account is meant to be useful in tracking and sorting differences among particular cases of trust (2006: 79-80). She focuses mainly on the way that different accounts of trust distinguish between trust and reliance. Her own attempt at developing a generic account of trust involves taking and developing Holton's participant-stance account as the generic view. According to Walker's generic account, we should merge the participant-stance account with the expectation that trustees act as they are relied upon (2006: 79-80). Now independently of her reasons for the importance of such an account, and given that we have solely focused on specific accounts of trust, how does unwelcome trust bear on the issue of a generic account of trust?

If my analysis is correct, and we have clear cases where one and only one model of unwelcome trust is required, then it seems the domain of the phenomena is disjoint. This means that a family of analyses of trust is required to explain the different sorts of cases where trust is rejected. How-

ever, since the domain is disjoint, there is no way of providing a unified, or generic account of unwelcome trust. This in turn, gives an argument against the possibility of a generic account of trust. However, it should be stressed, my analysis does speak to the importance of having many different accounts of trust, even if they are ultimately non-unifiable in the way that Walker's account suggests.

7. *Conclusion*

In this essay I have provided a sustained analysis of unwelcome trust. I have done so by reconstructing some general views of trust, in order that they may be shown to offer up explanations for why we sometimes reject the trust of other people. I drew two conclusions from this analysis. First, accounts of trust generally fall into two categories: what I have called the trust-rejection model and the entrusting-rejection model of unwelcome trust. There are of course finer grained distinctions to be made between each account, especially in terms of how they understand trust, but each fall into two distinct models of *unwelcome* trust. Second, both models of unwelcome trust are required to explain the phenomena. The example of unwelcome trust in professional relationships yields a situation where the entrusting-rejection model provides the correct explanation of why the trust is rejected, and the example of unwelcome therapeutic trust is an example where the trust-rejection model provides the correct explanation. I have also considered two different objections to this disjunctive account of unwelcome trust. One might think that we need to develop other models of unwelcome trust that are based on either participant-stance accounts of trust, or on virtue theories of trustworthiness. I have argued that the participant-stance account can be accommodated under the trust-rejection model, and that virtue theories of trustworthiness add an important enrichment to the entrusting-rejection model of unwelcome trust. I have also shown how this analysis of unwelcome trust bears on the possibility of developing a unified, generic account of trust. My analysis suggests that this is not possible, but that a non-unified family of trust accounts is required.

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Abstract

An account of trust or trustworthiness must also explain what is known as unwelcome or unwanted trust (Jones 1996; McLeod 2002, 2004). Unwelcome trust typically arises when the trustor expects a specific type of action from trustee, but the trustee, for whatever reason, does not want to do what the trustor wants. The existence of unwelcome trust raises a difficult question for any account of trust or trustworthiness. Which accounts of trust can best explain unwelcome trust? I show first how different accounts of trust and trustworthiness imply that we need two different models of unwelcome trust. The entrusting-rejection model explains unwelcome trust as a mismatch between how the agents perceive their relationship (Baier 1986; McLeod 2002,

2004). The sort of relationship that is being entrusted to the trustee is what is being rejected. The trust-rejection model of unwelcome trust, on the other hand, sees it as a matter of perceived coercion. According to this view, the trust itself is rejected, not whatever it is that is being entrusted (Jones 1996; Pettit 1995). I will argue, by way of some key examples, that unwelcome trust fits neither view, and that a disjunctive or generic account of trust is required (Walker 2006). I close by defending this thesis against two objections.

Keywords: unwelcome trust; trustworthiness; trust-rejection model; entrusting-rejection model.

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