TY - JOUR AU - Bina, Federico PY - 2022/12/24 Y2 - 2024/03/28 TI - Models of moral decision-making: Recent advances and normative relevance JF - Teoria. Rivista di filosofia JA - TeoRiv VL - 42 IS - 2 SE - Articles DO - 10.4454/teoria.v42i2.166 UR - https://www.rivistateoria.eu/index.php/teoria/article/view/166 SP - 201-214 AB - <p>In the last decades, research in cognitive psychology and neuroscience fueled a rich debate about i) the main mechanisms underlying human (moral) decision-making and ii) their reliability. In this paper, I first make clear that the emotion/reason distinction should be set aside, although this does not imply casting doubt on dual-process models in general. To support this idea, I discuss a dual-process framework for moral decision-making informed by computational models of reinforcement learning. I finally consider some normative implications of this research, stressing their procedural, rather than substantive, nature.</p> ER -