TY - JOUR AU - Greco, Lorenzo PY - 2018/12/18 Y2 - 2024/03/29 TI - Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge JF - Teoria. Rivista di filosofia JA - TeoRiv VL - 38 IS - 2 SE - Articles DO - 10.4454/teoria.v38i2.50 UR - https://www.rivistateoria.eu/index.php/teoria/article/view/50 SP - 123-133 AB - <p>In this essay I discuss some elements of Hume’s virtue ethics that distinguishes it from the neo-Aristotelian approach. I stress some of its characteristics – its emphasis on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlight its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I do that by defending an interpretation of Hume’s virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or vicious characters.</p> ER -