The opposition between motion and rest in Aristotle’s Categories

Abstract

In chapter 14 of the Categories, Aristotle examines the concepts of motion (κίνησις) and rest (ἠρεµία), distinguishing several types based on the categories of substance, quantity, quality, and place. Subsequently, three forms of opposition are posited: (a) in general, between motion and rest; (b) between particular kinds of motion; (c) between particular types of motion and particular types of rest. However, Aristotle does not explicitly explain the nature of the opposition underlying this classification. While scholars acknowledge the laconic character of Aristotle’s text, they have not advanced a solution to this problem. This paper argues that in distinguishing types of motion and rest and describing the oppositional relations in Categories 14, Aristotle implicitly relies on the form of opposition defined in Categories 10, namely that based on possession (ἕξις) and privation (στέρησις). A comparison with the treatment of motion in Physics V 1–6 and the discussion of “privation” in Metaphysics Δ 22 will prove essential in demonstrating the coherence of Aristotle’s account of motion and rest across his corpus.