Embodied cognition, causal theory of action and sense of agency

Abstract

 It is necessary to wait for the most recent developments of embodied cognition to give empirical evidence to the bodily involvement of the agent in the theory of action. The construct of the “sense of agency” provides new elements to overcome the vision of an agency theorized in the absence of bodily mechanisms of sensory processing and motor control. It provides a direct knowledge of our actions based neither on observation nor inference and can be implemented in a computational model of the agent. What is more, robotics studies fit into this picture. By investigating what happens at the neural level when we add an extension to the agent’s body makes it possible to correlate the knowledge related to the phenomenological experience with the knowledge related to the neural level. By combining a theoretical approach with a radical approach that relies on the construction of complete intelligent systems with a real apparatus of perception and movement that interacts with the environment, one can avoid misleading results. This approach presents strong evidence that the sense of agency originates in the neural processes responsible for the motor aspects of action. I will discuss how these recent results are compatible with a causal theory of action. My aim is to contribute to a compatibilist perspective able of integrating the knowledge stemming from different approaches to the same phenomenon. Paying scientific attention to the body does not necessarily mean surrendering to naturalism; it implies not being entangled in an alleged tension between two cultures.