Vol. 38 No. 2 (2018): Virtue Ethics

Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge

Lorenzo Greco
University of Oxford

Published 2018-12-18


  • Hume,
  • Aristotle,
  • virtues and vices,
  • character,
  • subjectivism,
  • moral pluralism
  • ...More

How to Cite

Greco, L. (2018). Against Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics: The Humean Challenge. Teoria. Rivista Di Filosofia, 38(2), 123–133. https://doi.org/10.4454/teoria.v38i2.50


In this essay I discuss some elements of Hume’s virtue ethics that distinguishes it from the neo-Aristotelian approach. I stress some of its characteristics – its emphasis on character traits rather than on actions, the role it reserves for moral education, its being sentimentalist – and highlight its points of strength with respect to the neo-Aristotelian version. I do that by defending an interpretation of Hume’s virtue ethics in terms of a form of subjectivism hinging on individuals possessing virtuous or vicious characters.